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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL:





One should judge today's tort-and-insurance system for medical
malpractice by traditional tort standards: would a reasonable person, asked
for informed consent, choose this particular system as a means of policing
medical care and paying for medical injuries? The short answer is "probably
not," but a full analysis must weigh the system's costs against its benefits, then
compare the results against those of feasible alternatives. In this calculus,
quality medical care is the most important element.
Significant costs of today's medical malpractice system include relatively
objective fiscal elements like private liability insurance premiums (including
self-insurance) that cover awards for economic loss and for pain and suffering,
as well as public spending for courtrooms, judges, and juries. Highly
subjective and intangible costs also need to be counted, such as the effects on
medical practice and the availability of care, the impact of delayed
compensation or rehabilitation on injured patients, time costs of plaintiffs and
defendants, and damage to professional reputations and patient trust.
Traditionally, benefits of the tort system are said to take two forms-
compensation and deterrence.' Claimant-plaintiffs injured by the
substandard behavior of a defendant-insured are to be "made whole" for the
legally cognizable damages incurred. And, by virtue of having to pay in full
for the consequences of their mistakes, medical providers are deterred from
faulty conduct, so that quality of care is maintained. The heated debate over
medical malpractice and other civil remedies, however, shows the influence of
a third benefit for many people-an almost indefinable sense of accountability
or retribution that comes from the operation of a fault-based system of
compensation and deterrence.2
This cost and benefit calculus is easy to describe but difficult to implement.
The quality of available evidence is poor. Moreover, both supporters and
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1. See, e.g., W. SEAVEY, P. KEETON & R. KEETON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1
(1954).
2. Special Committee on the Tort Liability System, Am. Bar Ass'n, Towards a Jurisprudence of
Injury (report to the Am. Bar Ass'n 1984) (lists many benefits not analytically separate from the three
noted here, for example, availability of grievance mechanisms, risk spreading, and retribution).
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detractors of the status quo engage in strategic omissions and exaggerations
in evaluating that evidence. They also assign different weights to the
intangible elements. Finally, virtually all discussions, including most of this
paper, treat all medical care and all types of malpractice in the aggregate
rather than attempting to differentiate among different areas.
This article contends that the value of the tort and liability insurance
system as a deterrent to substandard medical care is the most important factor
to consider. The system inefficiently delivers compensation, and its intangible
costs and benefits tend to offset one another. The liability deterrent probably
does help improve the quality of certain medical care, although not nearly as
effectively as one might like. Overall, other quality protections are probably
more important than malpractice law to patients' well being. There is some
danger that well-intentioned reforms that cut back across the board on
plaintiffs' rights to compensation without providing effective replacements
will reduce the number of valid claims along with invalid ones. They may thus
weaken existing quality incentives without substituting effective replacements,
whether through regulatory or market-oriented means.
Because today's system handles so few of the valid claims that could be
brought, medical quality would probably be better served in the long run by
increasing rather than reducing the number of liability claims. Such an
improved system should simultaneously reduce the expense and agony
involved in each case and strengthen other quality-control mechanisms that
are better suited to address aspects of medical care poorly reached by
malpractice law. These goals are more easily stated than achieved and would
not make the system cheaper, just more valuable.
II
COSTS OF THE MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
The malpractice system is expensiye. The most obvious cost is that of
liability coverage for providers. The A.M. Best Company reports premiums
for conventional insurance totalling some $2,257,760,000 in 1984. 3 Amounts
allocated for various alternatives, such as self-insurance, reinsurance only, or
coverage by a "captive" insurer, are not tabulated, but are probably somewhat
less. 4 It is estimated that physicians bear nearly two-thirds of this "premium"
burden, and hospitals bear most of the remainder. 5 As a share of gross
revenues, malpractice premiums are in the range of three to five percent for
doctors, and under one percent for hospitals. They total about one to one
3. BEST'S INS. MGMT. REP., GENERAL LIABILITY AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
MARKETING-1984, Sept. 2, 1985.
4. Posner, Trends in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1986, at 37, 44.
5. This estimate is based on information supplied to the author personally by insurance
company executives.
[Vol. 49: No. 2
Page 321: Spring 19861 QUALITY OF CARE
and one-half percent of overall personal health care spending, although with
wide variation by provider, specialty, and location. 6
Through 1984, the premium percentages had changed little since the mid-
1970's "crisis" in coverage, which itself significantly raised the earlier figure
of about one-half of one percent.7 These percentages may have edged up
again somewhat as a result of 1985 developments. In the aggregate,
malpractice costs are (in a sense) borne by patients and their health insurers
who pay for care. When liability premiums increase, however, providers may
or may not be able to "pass through" the full increase, depending on health
insurance payment rules and market resistance to price rises8 as well as on
how smoothly the insurance market works in translating costs into premiums. 9
Few of the additional costs often attributed to the malpractice system are
well documented. Physicians lose time from practice to defend lawsuits and
sometimes hire counsel independent of their liability insurers, but the dollars
involved are small relative to insurance premiums.' 0 Similar time costs for
plaintiffs appear not to have been estimated. Both plaintiffs and defendants
also endure some emotional costs of disputation and delay, the value of which
is unknown but which may be considerable in particular cases.II The judicial
6. See Posner, supra note 4, at 49-51; Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, Information on Malpractice:
A Review of Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 92-93.
7. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 93. The lack of change in apparent
premium burden is somewhat deceptive, since the pattern of coverage has changed. The
increasingly common "claims-made" coverage spreads risk from the coverage year's incidents of
malpractice into future years-and future premiums. This shift has held the growth of premiums
below what it would have been under previously universal "occurrence" coverage. On the other
hand, providers have surely raised the upper limits of their coverage-given rising awards-which
increases premiums for what is considered adequate protection.
8. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 106-07.
9. This article focuses on medical-legal issues at the expense of insurance ones. For many
physicians, much of the malpractice cost problem is the abruptness with which premium rates can
rise, often with essentially retroactive effect. Because malpractice claims are low-frequency events
with high losses (or "severity") and trends must be extrapolated quite far into the future, initial
expectations on which premiums are based can be subject to volatile shifts. Both the behavior of
claimants and of legal rules and process seem unpredictable relative to insured events of many other
lines of insurance. Premiums are also affected by cyclical trends in insurance and reinsurance
markets generally. Regulators and other legal system actors may postpone or exacerbate shifts,
making accommodation to price rises more difficult. See generally Posner, supra note 4; Roddis &
Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281. As this article goes to press, it appears
that current pricing and availability problems for malpractice coverage are greatly influenced by far
larger problems in liability and property-casualty insurance generally. See, e.g., Hilder, Small Firms
Face Sharp Cost Hikes for Insurance-If They Can Get It, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 23, col. 4. Liability
insurance problems generally have risen to the level of a Time cover story, Sory, America, Your
Insurance Has Been Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 16, and White House attention, e.g., Liability
Changes Proposed, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1986, at AI, col. 1.
10. Cf Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 107 (1983 average was about $250 per
physician per year).
11. On physicians' reactions to lawsuits, see SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS., AM.
MEDICAL Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 1, at 20 (originally published as a
supplement to AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 1984) [hereinafter cited as AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1,]
(psychiatrist's survey of 14 physicians from Chicago area sued during 1977-1981). Some plaintiffs
may delay appropriate rehabilitation for fear that otherwise they could not convince a future jury of
the full extent of their injuries. Similarly, providers who see a chance to ameliorate iatrogenic injury
may hesitate to act lest their action be seen as an admission of culpability. Conceptually, it is equally
plausible that fear of future damages might encourage providers to promote early rehabilitation,
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system itself is hardly free, although it is not clear what share of its costs
should be apportioned to malpractice.
Truly large cost estimates, however, arise only from calculations about so-
called "defensive medicine," notably the extra tests and procedures
undertaken not for medical purposes but for their potential defensive value in
a lawsuit. The American Medical Association's official 1984 estimate of $15.1
billion annually is frequently cited.' 2 An informal estimate of approximately
$40 billion has also been published.' 3 Despite their wide circulation,' 4 these
huge estimates almost certainly exaggerate a very real problem.' 5 In addition
to practicing such "positive" defensive medicine, providers may also be
deterred from undertaking valuable but risky procedures, that is, they may
practice "negative" defensive medicine. In the extreme case, practitioners
may withdraw from certain medical fields altogether to avoid suit or high
malpractice premiums. For instance, some obstetricians no longer deliver
babies and some physicians have retired early.' 6 Withholding services may be
a larger problem than adding unnecessary ones, but the withholding and its
effect on patient access to needed care remains wholly unquantified. 17
Finally, some observers count the erosion of the traditional and beneficial
trust between patient and provider as a cost of an expanding malpractice
system.' 8 This apparent erosion could just as easily cause more claims as
result from them, however. Part of what has also been lost is not trust, but
rather unquestioning deference to professional authority, which itself has its
costs as well as its benefits.
Although many costs are unquantified or unquantifiable, they are clearly
high, at least relative to costs for the preceding generation. The costs may be
sharply increasing as well, given the current trends in liability premiums
generally. A significant question is whether the changes in the insurance
markets mainly represent a cyclical swing or rather a permanent ratcheting
upward of prices similar to what seems to have occurred a decade ago. 19
especially among potential plaintiffs who might be less likely to sue if attended to promptly.
Apparently no empirical evidence on this question exists.
12. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note I1, at 16.
13. Brinkley, AMA Study Finds Big Rise for Claims in Malpractice, N.Y. Times,Jan. 17, 1985, at Al,
col. 4 (AMA internal study estimates $40 billion in defensive tests and treatments).
14. Fine & Sunshine, Malpractice Reform Through Consumer Acceptance and Consumer Education: Are
the New Concepts Marketable?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 213, 215 .
15. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 108-09; accord Mills, Infomation Please, 6J.
LEGAL MED. 255, 256-58 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Malcolm, Fear of Malpractice Suits Leading Some Doctors to Quit Obstetrics, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 1; OBs, Surgeons Fight State Insurance Pinch, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1986, at
1, col. 3 (reporting that 70% of Mass. obstetricians plan to stop taking new patients). But see Knox,
Why Mass. Doctors Are Saying No, Boston Globe, Feb. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 4 (only 1% of all doctors
curtailed services in Massachusetts, most only temporarily).
17. Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 109-10. When providers cease to perform
some procedure, they clearly lose access to patients, but whether patients lose access to care depends
upon what other providers do.
18. E.g., Cohn, The Price of Malpractice, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1986, (Health), at 12, col. 1, ("new
lack of trust" worst effect of "malpractice crisis").
19. Cf Posner, supra note 4, at 48-49 (on insurance cycles).
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Whatever the current costs may be, however, they should be compared with
their benefits, not with the costs of last year or of the last generation of
providers.
III
BENEFITS OF THE MALPRACTICE SYSTEM
A. Accountability
Perhaps the most fundamental, but also the most intangible, benefit of our
fault-based liability system is the sense of fairness and accountability that it
provides. This benefit goes beyond the value of compensating particular
individuals and deterring particular substandard practices. For malpractice,
as for much of tort law, most people like the idea that wrongdoers can in
theory be called to account and made to pay for their transgressions. Quite
apart from penalizing specific errors and compensating their victims, the
existence of a malpractice remedy allows patients to command more attention
from providers.20 Moreover, while almost any accident engenders sympathy
for the innocent victim, "accidents" caused by a culpable party also engender
a desire for personal and social retribution. The world seems a "righter"
place where such wrongdoing is detected and social values of good conduct
are overtly emphasized.
The American consciousness often naturally turns to tort law and
litigation-with their clear-cut battles over right and wrong-to vindicate
these philosophic and emotional desires for accountability and retribution. In
this sense, tort actions-even without punitive damages-are a halfway house
for affronts to justice that are not severe enough to warrant criminal
prosecution. Where punitive damages are sought, tort law parallels criminal
law even more closely.
Analysis can do little more than note that this intangible benefit exists, at
least for some types of claims. Its influence is evident in reform debates about
reducing the role of fault in liability and insurance systems generally. 2' How
highly valued it is cannot be directly assessed. It seems fair to conclude that
individuals seldom consider the issue because they never "buy" justice
directly, but only indirectly through social choices; and people may well
underestimate its costs, given widespread liability insurance. In any event,
20. Havighurst, Reforming Malpractice Law Through Consumer Choice, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1984, at
63, 66.
21. Both potential defendants and potential plaintiffs may reject departures from fault-based
determinations of liability. Indeed, one of physicians' most heated complaints is that many of today's
malpractice determinations already impose liability without real regard to fault, at least in cases of
particularly sympathetic plaintiffs. They seem to feel that only much more negligent behavior should
be deemed liable. Among the general public, the clearest example of this phenomenon comes from
the debate on no-fault versus fault-based automobile liability systems. See, e.g., Finger Pointing Precedes
Showdown on No-Fault, Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1985, at Cl, col. 5 (legislator's vote against no-fault
explained: "constituents want to sue"); Herbert, What's Wrong with Finding Fault?, Wash. Post, Nov.
23, 1985, at A21, col. 3 (letter to the editor). It can be argued that the personal injury bar has
fostered this demand for fault finding, but the reverse may also be true.
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these imponderable factors tend to confound dispassionate consideration of
the effects of the malpractice system and of reform proposals. Compensation
and deterrence are more readily discussed.
B. Compensation
As a method of compensating injured patients, malpractice law and
insurance fail miserably. The litany of complaints about malpractice liability
as a compensation system is well known. First, and most tellingly, very few
injured patients ever bring a claim, much less receive any compensation, even
after years of rapid growth in claims frequency. 22 Malpractice recoveries may
be important to meet medical bills and lost wages resulting from some
medical injuries, presumably the more serious ones which may exhaust other
sources of coverage, but recoveries are not, in the aggregate, a major source
of compensation. Second, the "carrying charges" for determining and
delivering that compensation are quite high, compared with other
compensation systems. Malpractice claims return perhaps forty to fifty cents
on the insurance dollar, similar to the return on auto liability coverage, but
only half or less of the return on private disability or health coverage, and less
yet than social "insurance" like Social Security or Medicare, for which
administrative expenses claim only a few percentage points of program
22. This phenomenon has long been noted, e.g., Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, The Incidence of
Iatrogenic Injuries, in U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE & APPENDIX app. 50 (1973), but it is not well documented. A
reasonable current estimate is that, at the very most, one in five medical mistakes in hospitals leads to
a claim and, at most, one in ten receives any compensation. This very rough estimate is the only
reasonable calculation that can be made. It rests on ten-year old data from a sample of 1974 hospital
injuries in California and a virtual census of malpractice claims closed shortly thereafter, updated to
today's experience by assuming a doubling of claims frequency and slight increase in likelihood of
recovery (with no change in negligence) since then. Because California has high claims frequency, its
experience overstates that of the nation at large. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at
94-95; see also P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 20-25
(1985).
Virtually nothing is known about outpatient care, which is mainly performed in physicians' offices,
although some 22% of paid claims originate in non-hospital incidents. See NAT'L Ass'N INS.
COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION (M. Sowka ed. 1980) (medical malpractice
closed claims 1975-1978).
The problem of negligent damage that is never brought into the malpractice system might be
larger or smaller outside the hospital setting. On the one hand, one might surmise that existing
quality control and patient oversight is best in the highly organized institutional setting so that
accidents there are reduced, and when they do occur they are dealt with more rapidly. On the other
hand, the most serious diagnosis and care gravitates to hospitals, so that the likelihood of doing
comparable harm outside them seems reduced-at least in terms of the significant economic injury
needed to justify the high cost of bringing a malpractice action. Ample medical documentation
exists, going back to the pioneering study a generation ago by Osler Peterson, of astonishingly low-
quality outpatient care. Peterson, Andrews & Spain, An Analytical Study of North Carolina General
Practice 1953-1954 (pt. 2), 31 J. MED. EDUC. 1 (1956) (60% of physician office therapy below
acceptable standards). But no examination is known to exist of how such low-quality outpatient
practice relates to malpractice in the medical-legal sense. The issue is probably becoming more
important as hospital cost-containment pressures and competition from lower priced delivery sites
move more care outside of hospitals to ambulatory surgicenters, physicians' offices, nursing homes,
and elsewhere.
Page 321: Spring 1986] QUALITY OF CARE
spending. 23 Excessive lawyers' fees are often blamed for this low return,
although it is infrequently noted that fees are similar on both sides.
Third, awards allegedly correspond poorly with the need for
compensation as measured by economic loss, although evidence on this point
seems quite mixed. 24  Fourth, some critics have long opposed the tort
standard of "full compensation" as excessive, at least as applied in medical
cases, especially with regard to coverage of losses payable by collateral
sources and for intangible "pain and suffering." 25 A similar argument has
more recently emerged with regard to the nontaxability of tort payments for
lost, otherwise taxable, income. Indeed, the tort goal of making a victim
"whole" does go beyond what is paid by not-dissimilar coverage that people
buy for themselves or by public programs, which universally leave some
burden of loss on claimants. 26 This extra generosity of tort law, not unique to
malpractice,27 may reflect an extra increment for the wrongdoing of
tortfeasors, an element not present in pure compensation schemes. It may
also constitute a tacit acknowledgment of the need to finance high legal
expenses, which are almost never necessary under first-party insurance,
without unduly cutting into a claimant's "take home" compensation.
Fifth, and seldom-noted, malpractice awards may overcompensate because
they fail to limit damages to the extra risk caused by the faulty behavior.2 8
Finally, compensation is often long delayed. Although forty-two percent of
claims settle within a year of filing, fully five percent are not resolved after five
23. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 100; P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 186.
24. Compare NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, supra note 22 (differences in economic loss account
for little of the variation in malpractice settlements), with P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 39-42
(measures of compensable damages, plus legal doctrines, do significantly influence settlements).
Available data make it difficult to assess this point; not only are claims files incomplete with regard to
claimants' economic loss but payments also often fail to itemize damages; for example, they fail to
isolate the amount of noneconomic "pain and suffering." P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 171-73.
25. E.g., O'Connell, Neo-No-fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual
Alternatives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 125, 125.
26. Danzon argues this point of view most forcefully. See, e.g., P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 152-
58.
27. Although legal rules for assessing damage are essentially the same for all tort cases, it is
sometimes argued that medical defendants are in practice made to pay more for similar injuries than
are other defendants. The only apparent empirical evidence for such an assertion comes from a
Rand Corporation study of Cook County litigation. M. PETERSON, COMPENSATION OF INJURIES: CIVIL
JURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 29-34 (The Rand Corp. Report No. R-3011-ICJ, 1984). Both
malpractice defendants and corporate defendants in product liability cases were found to pay
considerably more for similar injuries than less well insured defendants, like automobile owners. See
the discussion in Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 100.
28. Cf Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 1375, 1403-06 (phenomenon in HMO context). Allocation of damages according to the degree
of culpability may sometimes occur in the context of comparative negligence or of joint and several
liability. Similarly, where the damage consists of negligently failing to diagnose or treat an
underlying condition (a relatively uncommon ground for a claim), recovery (at least in theory) should
be apportioned in light of what damage the condition would have caused even if well treated. When
negligence causes a new problem, however, as in the typical case, the defense must pay for all
damages to make the plaintiff "whole" as though there would otherwise have been 100% success.
Neither the medical profession nor the law likes to recognize that good medicine often fails to achieve
100% success or that no patient awaiting treatment is "whole," given that even the best treated
patient must run some risk.
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years. 29 Moreover, interim payments for timely rehabilitation are not
generally available under liability coverage; most such funding naturally
comes from other sources in any case.
These often repeated complaints about compensation address the
payments that are actually made-and generally conclude that they cost too
much. The most damning indictment of malpractice as a compensation
system, however, remains that so few people with a valid case for
compensation actually bring a claim, and still fewer of these are paid. 30
If compensation were the only function of malpractice law and insurance,
society would have scrapped the system long ago. Indeed, our personal and
social choices show that we rely hardly at all on malpractice remedies to cover
ourselves against losses from medical accidents. Instead, almost all damages
are met by other private or public mechanisms, such as health and life
insurance, sick pay, disability coverage, and other third-party programs, not to
mention patients' personal income or assets, and providers' charity. 31 In the
real world, what tort law calls "collateral" sources are the main sources of
actual compensation. The malpractice system, however, is not a
compensation system but is rather a liability system. The system should be
judged mainly in terms of its intended deterrent effects, which play no part in
the first-party insurance or social programs that work much better for
compensation.
C. Deterrence
1. Problems in Assessing Deterrence. Does the threat of malpractice improve the
quality of medical care by reducing the likelihood or extent of substandard
care? Intuitively, the answer should be yes it does, to a certain degree.
Unfortunately, the emotions roused by this question are matched only by the
lack of evidence on it. This lack seems astonishing, given the central
importance of deterrence as a justification for the various costs of an
increasingly expensive malpractice system. Documentation is very poor even
29. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 193. As Danzon notes, increasing the speed of resolution might
be costly. Id. at 194. Critics of the tort system would also be disappointed if greater speed (and
hence lower costs in time and uncertainty) led more claimants to hold out for trial or to file claims to
begin with.
30. See P. DANZON, WHY ARE MALPRACTICE PREMIUMS So HIGH-OR So Low? 23 (The Rand
Corp. Report No. R2623-HCFA, 1980) See also note 22 supra and accompanying text.
31. Like many obvious truisms about medical injuries, this one is hard to document. No broad
studies seem to exist of injured patients to determine how their losses were met. Cf Zuckerman,
Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 99-100. Indeed, even malpractice insurance claims files often in
the past failed to indicate what other sources had paid for damages, P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 171-
73, although data must since have improved in jurisdictions where the extent of collateral sources
can now influence malpractice awards. As a practical matter, it suffices to note that some 90% of the
population has health coverage and presumably uses it to pay for medical accidents. In contrast, only
a small fraction of people injured by medical mistakes receive malpractice compensation. See text
accompanying note 22 supra.
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about whether the system has any deterrent effects much less about how great
the deterrent is for various types of care or how it might be improved.3 2
Empirical data are almost wholly lacking and may be impossible to
develop. "Quality" is an elusive concept and is very hard to define or
specify, 33 much less measure, and not just in medical care, as anyone can
testify who has ever tried to write precise specifications for a product, service,
or job. Assessing or measuring the quality of medical care is especially
difficult given how often medicine is as much an art as a science and given the
complexities of the human organism whose functioning medicine tries to
improve is so complex. Moreover, quality goes beyond technical medical
matters to include aspects of personal service such as providing information
and solace, and making patients "feel better" in intangible ways.
Merely reaching professional consensus on the narrow issue of whether a
new procedure works as intended can take years and hundreds of published
clinical reports or massive randomized experiments. 34 Broader quality
assessments are almost never attempted. There is general agreement that the
most important quality measures are treatment outcomes, such as patient
survival versus death and return to normal functioning versus disability.
Actually implementing such concepts has proven an elusive goal. Patients
seeking counsel on where and how best to treat a condition must ultimately
rely on more or less informed expert judgment-as do courts considering
whether malpractice has occurred. So, too, society must for the moment be
content with reasoned opinion in attempting to assess the deterrent value of
liability rules and process.
A major problem, of course, is that the professional experts on deterrence
are so divided on its effect-too often along predictable lines of economic
self-interest. Further, the experts' assessments seem to rely more on
anecdotes and hunches than on well compiled "clinical" experience, much
less on dispassionate weighing of broader evidence. Finally, conflicting
opinions about quality and deterrence can all be "right" depending on the
experts' perspective. Plaintiffs' lawyers know from experience that egregious
mistakes "often" occur; the self-selected results appear in their offices.
Doctors, to the contrary, know to their dismay that bad outcomes "often"
occur for no obvious reason at all, much less one related to a particular failing
of medical skill or performance.
32. Cf Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 87 (little evidence on quality and
malpractice). One major compilation of health services research did not even include the
malpractice system as a category related to health outcome. L. FREEBURG, J. LAVE, L. LAVE & S.
LEINHARDT, 1 HEALTH STATUS, MEDICAL CARE UTILIZATION AND OUTCOME: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES (NCHSR Research Report Series No. 78-184, 1979). Nor did a
review of the literature on quality of medical care. See infra note 33.
33. See, e.g., DONABEDIAN, NEEDED RESEARCH IN THE ASSESSMENT AND MONITORING OF THE
QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE (NCHSR Research Report Series No. 78-145, 1978); see also Anderson &
Shields, Quality Measurement and Control in Physician Decision Making, 17 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH,
Summer 1982, at 125.
34. See generally DONABEDIAN, supra note 33, and sources cited therein.
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2. Specific Contentions. Lacking systematic evidence, legislators and others
must rely on intuitive judgment in deciding where between the extreme
positions the truth probably lies. There is no lack of particular arguments
about deterrence or the lack of it. Any would-be assessor is left to consider
the contentions one at a time. To begin with the opponents:
a. Liability is simply irrelevant to good medical practice. One of the more
common assertions is also the crudest. The contention is that because only
professional and technical concern for the patient matters, potential liability is
irrelevant to the quality of care. In light of the simultaneous assertion that
providers respond to potential liability with enormous amounts of nearly
worthless "defensive medicine," it seems highly implausible that providers do
not at least try to improve medical outcomes as well. The best defense against
a claim, after all, is that no damage has occurred.
b. Malpractice claims strike haphazardly, like lightning bolts. The second
contention is that liability experience cannot serve as a guide for good
medical practice, because the careful and careless are equally vulnerable. The
lightning analogy runs through much malpractice commentary, 35 despite its
obvious weaknesses as a metaphor. 36 In fact, claims do not seem to be as
evenly distributed across practitioners as one would expect if claims were
random events. Certain physicians, even within recognized specialty rating
categories, for example, do seem to have more than their "share."3 7 So, too,
do certain insurers. 38 Such findings are hardly conclusive, however, especially
35. See, e.g. Havighurst, supra note 20, at 67; Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence,
298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282, 1282 (1978) (both studies list common criticisms).
36. Lightning damage, of course, only seems random, mainly because it is very rare in any one
observer's personal experience, much as malpractice claims at least used to be. In fact, of course,
lightning predictably strikes elevated objects and good conductors of electricity. Risk factors are
thus in fact understood, as is prevention-either put up a lightning rod or lie low until the storm
passes. An understanding of the causes and prevention of malpractice is far less well developed, in
part because of the strongly held professional belief in the randomness of occurrences. Given
providers' reactions to liability, a better metaphor might cast malpractice claims as the sword of
Damocles-an act of man, not nature. Lawyers and patients have arbitrarily hung a malpractice
sword above the medical professional's head as a reminder of medical vulnerability. The sword
hangs by a thread and could drop at any time without regard to professional conduct. This metaphor
is offered not as an accurate picture of malpractice rules and process, but rather of professional
attitudes toward them.
37. See, e.g., Rolph, Some Statistical Evidence on Merit Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance, 48 J.
RIsK &INS. 247 (1981) (of8,000 Los Angeles physicians studied over four years, 0.6% accounted for
10% of all claims and 30% of all payments).
38. According to data reported by the AMA, overall claims frequency for physician mutual
insurers is almost double that of some other insurers. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note 11, at
10 (1983 physician-owned insurers had almost one claim for every four covered physicians, whereas
commercial insurers had only about one claim for every ten insureds). However, such aggregated
information is unreliable in that it fails to adjust for different reporting practices or for the
proportion of physicians covered in different known risk categories; general practitioners have far
fewer claims than obstetricians or neurosurgeons. It is also difficult to document whether frequent
defendants are bad practitioners or are good ones willing to treat the worst cases. But there is
increasing acceptance of the idea that frequent defendants should at least be investigated further in
the context of hospital privileges or state licensure. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS.,
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given the low probability per provider of having a claim in any one insured
period.
It is clearly true that other factors than substandard care influence claims
frequency, among them legal doctrines and urbanization;3 9 a favorite
hypothesis of medical providers is that nonmedical factors are the main
cause-over-litigious patients and too many lawyers. 40 There can be no direct
test of the influence of substandard care on malpractice claims, or vice versa,
because there is no clear-cut, agreed-upon, independent definition to use for
analysis, much less statistics on amounts and locations of low quality. But one
relevant analysis found that one available medical measure-extent of surgery
per capita-was a better predictor of a state's claims experience than
availability of lawyers. 4' Even medical professionals sometimes acknowledge
that "[t]he reason for malpractice claims is malpractice. ' 42
c. The legal process itself is faulty. The expectations of claims adjusters,
who in fact settle most claims, are guided by the likelihood that a certain
malpractice claim will result in an adverse trial verdict. If courts and juries do
not accurately assess whether substandard care caused the damage being
reimbursed, liability obviously cannot correctly deter bad practice. The
argument that trials and claims settlement do not rationally relate to bad care
takes several forms:
(1) Malpractice claims resolution is a "lottery. " Like the lightning metaphor
for the haphazard bringing of claims, this oft-repeated assertion 43 implies that
the malpractice system is also random in how it settles claims. The metaphor
is a powerful one, especially as applied to certain cases whose outcomes are
unpredictable, notably large lawsuits that go all the way to a jury precisely
because liability or damages are uncertain and hotly contested. But it is
unwise to focus on the very few cases that are not settled before a jury verdict
(and it is well to recall that defendants win most such cases). 44 The most
AM. MEDICAL Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 3, at 16 (originally published as a
supplement to AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 1985) [hereinafter cited as AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 3 ].
39. See Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J. LAW & ECON. 115
(1984).
40. Some physicians are even willing to pay for information about potentially litigious patients.
See, e.g., Doctors and Lawyers Square Off on Legal Records, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1985, at B17, col. 1
(entrepreneur claims "overwhelming response" to offer of data on patients' records in civil
litigation); see also Malpractice Foes Enter Computer Age, MED. WORLD NEWS, Dec. 9, 1985, at 22.
41. Medical Foes Enter Computer Age, supra note 40. Evidence is mixed about the influence of the
availability of lawyers on claims and hence on premiums. See Zuckerman, Koller & Bovbjerg, supra
note 6, at 96.
42. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note Ii, at 23 (quotingJames Todd, M.D., AMA's Senior
Deputy Executive Vice President).
43. E.g., O'Connell, supra note 25, at 127.
44. Tabulations of plaintiffs' success vary. In 1975-1978, fewer than 10% of closed claims had
gone to actual trials; of those going to jury verdict, plaintiffs won only about one-quarter. See P.
DANZON, supra note 22, at 31.
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thorough analysis of the entire claims settlement process concludes that it is
indeed rational in that results are consistent with a logical predictive model.45
(2) Non-meritorious or frivolous suits clog the system, yet must be settled because of
their "nuisance" value and therefore confound deterrent signals. During the last
"crisis," this complaint was frequently voiced. Physicians were encouraged to
bring countersuits for abuse of legal process, and "weeding out" such
"frivolous suits" was a major goal of pre-trial screening panels. 46 Today, this
argument is seldom heard, in part because screening does not seem to
eliminate the vast majority of claims, 47 but perhaps even more importantly
because providers themselves are much more involved in insurance generally
and in claims settlement, through physician-owned mutuals and other
arrangements.48
Outsiders rarely investigate actual malpractice settlements to assess them
independently for merit; any such review can of course be criticized as
"second-guessing," that is, for making ajudgment without having all the facts
that were available to claims adjusters and juries, nor their direct experiences
with the evidence.49 There is some indication, however, that the bulk of
settlements are reasonable. 50
(3) Claims and recoveries keep climbing, even though medical care has never been
better, so legal processes must be faulty and without reasonable deterrent effect. The
premises of this contention seem true, but the conclusion does not follow.
Claims have undeniably increased, and the ability of medical care to improve
health has clearly improved enormously in the past two generations. But the
45. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 30-53, for a strong argument that claims settlement is
rational, and that "despite its apparent perversities, the tort system in practice is far from random."
Id. at 49. Danzon bases her argument, however, on an aggregate analysis of how well actual
settlements relate to expected verdicts predicted by her conceptual model.
46. P. CARLIN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRIAL SCREENING PANELS: A REVIEW OF THE
EVIDENCE (George Washington Univ. Intergovernmental Health Policy Project 1980).
47. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 198-202, for a theoretical and empirical review of evidence
on screening panels, concluding that they may slightly increase litigation while slightly reducing
likelihood of a plaintiff award. But see Doctors and Lawyers Square Off on Legal Records, supra note 40
(physician asserts, "We know that 25 percent of medical malpractice suits are without merit.")
48. See generally Posner, supra note 4; SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROF. LIAB. & INS., AM. MEDICAL
Ass'N, PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80s, REPORT 2, at 7-8 (originally published as a supplement to
AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 1984) (roundtable discussion by insurance executives) [hereinafter cited as
AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 2 ].
49. According to Dr. Todd of the AMA, 95% of the dollars paid by physician mutual insurers are
completely defensible by peer review standards. INTERNAL MED. NEWS, Dec. 1-14, 1984. He and the
AMA, of course, nonetheless feel that current legal rules are unfair to defendants and should be
altered, specifically with regard to damages. See AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 3, supra note 38, at 11-14.
50. One independent review covered 220 obstetrics claims closed by the industry's largest
insurer during the period 1980 to 1982 in which either payment was made or $1000 or more was
spent on legal defense. Julian, Brooker, Butler, Joseph, Ogburn, Williams, Anderson, Shepard,
Preisler & Capell, Investigation of Obstetric Malpractice Closed Claims: Profile of Event, 2 AM. J.
PERINATOLOGY 320 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Julian]. It did not specifically judge meritoriousness
case by case but rather assessed the management of medically recognized risk factors in pregnancy
and delivery-of which there were 1001 risks in 220 cases. Id. at 321. In the reviewers' medical
opinion, only 54% of these were correctly recognized and documented by the providers involved,
with two-thirds of these correctly managed (32% of total); 66% of identifiable risks were involved in
outcomes that led to claims. Id. Claims did arise, however, even in the 32% of correctly managed
cases, although the authors do not report how many did so. Id. at 323.
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standard of care (set by customary practice and proven by expert testimony)
has risen along with medical capabilities. There is no indication that
providers are relatively more (or less) careful today than formerly, compared
to prevailing medical standards and hence reasonable social and patient
expectations. 5'
(4) The legal process often bases awards not on faulty conduct but on need for
compensation. A similar complaint is that patient-claimants and juries alike
expect perfection and want compensation awarded whenever it is not
achieved. 52 This may be true in particular cases with sympathetic plaintiffs
and unsympathetic defendants, especially with regard to the amounts awarded
as opposed to the basic determination of liability. 53 But it seems false in
general. Most claims receive no payment, 54 and far more medical injuries
occur than ever appear as claims, much less as recoveries. 55
d. Providers' liability insurance effectively eliminates whatever positive quality
incentives liability might theoretically create. For malpractice, as for tort generally,
liability coverage to pay awards removes defendants' direct financial incentive
to avoid liability. Insurance has been severely criticized on this ground,
56
more by academic commentators than by providers. Liability coverage,
however, is not theoretically incompatible with maintaining deterrence, given
the possibilities for experience rating and other mechanisms. 57 One can also
note that some tangible costs to defendants and many intangible ones are not
insured. 58
51. See generally Brook, Brutoco & Williams, The Relationship Between Medical Malpractice and Quality
of Care, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1209.
52. See, e.g., Malcolm, supra note 16, at D23, col. 5 (obstetrician says parents' attitude is "[w]e're
going to have fewer babies so we want a perfect baby"). Note, however, that if one obstetrician in six
faced a claim in 1983, id., then this implies at most some 5,000 cases. Infant mortality in 1983 was
about 40,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 56,
table 81 (1985). Birth defects were far more numerous.
53. Quite apart from jury sympathies, the law does intentionally sometimes assign a larger share
of damages to a defendant than was actually caused by his faulty conduct, notably through the
doctrine ofjoint and several liability. E.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975). Here, the goal of setting appropriate deterrent amounts that relate specifically
to one defendant's own failures are quite explicitly subordinated to the compensation goal of making
the injured party whole. The problem seems less severe for medical defendants, almost all of whom
are insured, have considerable assets, or both, than for motorists and many other types of potential
defendants who are more likely to be judgment-proof, and hence are able to shift larger amounts of
an award to a less responsible party. For a description of problems outside the malpractice area, see
American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978) (Clark, J., dissenting). See also discussion in note 28 supra; Sorry, America, Your Insurance Has
Been Cancelled, supra note 9, at 23-24.
54. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners' survey of virtually all closed claims
from 1975 to 1978 found that about half were closed without payment. NAT'L Ass'N INS. COMM'RS,
supra note 22, at 20. According to the AMA, about three-quarters of all claims that were closed
during the period 1980 to 1983 by physician-owned insurers linked to medical societies were closed
with no payment. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 2, supra note 48, at 6.
55. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. E.g., Schwartz & Komesar, supra note 35, at 1287-88.
57. See Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. ECON. 120 (1980).
58. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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In practice, various forms of experience rating and risk retention
(including self-insurance) apply mainly to hospitals and other institutional
providers, not to physicians, who pay the largest share of premiums. 59 It is
very curious that physicians and their insurers have not moved to rely partly
on experience rating, if only through retrospective adjustment of dividends,
which does not seem to pose unduly difficult conceptual or technical
difficulties. 60 It is plausible that physicians-who now write half their own
coverage through mutual insurance 6 '-resist experience rating because of the
strongly held belief that claims are random. Resisting insurance reforms that
might help some low rated providers also helps to maintain professional
pressure for weakening tort rules, which could benefit all providers.
On the other side of the ledger, the documented evidence that malpractice
claims do relate to substandard care is relatively weak, in large part for lack of
careful scrutiny. Again proceeding argument by argument:
e. Medical care often fails to meet accepted professional standards. Defenders of
the right to sue often emphasize that the basic malpractice problem is low
medical quality, not legal rules or processes.62 It is possible to cite a
considerable body of medical literature about quality failings in medical, not
medical-legal terms. 63 The one significant study to apply medical-legal
malpractice standards to care found that nearly one percent of hospital
admissions resulted in temporary or permanent disability or death as a result
of faulty care.64 One percent is a large number, given almost forty million
hospital stays a year.65 That quality deficiencies do exist, however, shows the
need for more effective control mechanisms. It does not show that
malpractice liability is, in fact, effective; this line of reasoning assumes the
conclusion.
f Other. In addition, some plaintiffs' lawyers report that cases they see
from low-claim areas, often rural ones, show much worse practice than high-
claim, big-city cases. 66 Beyond these specifics, defenders of deterrence also
reassert the general expectation that fiscal incentives act to promote caution
and note that an injured patient has no other recourse.
59. See generally Posner, supra note 4.
60. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1302-03; Rolph, supra note 37. Danzon argues that it is
economically efficient for physicians not to take deductibles in order to encourage vigorous defense
of all claims by insurers. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 114-36.
61. See Posner, supra note 4; AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 1, supra note 11.
62. E.g., T. Goddard, The American Medical Association is Wrong-There is No Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis (unpublished paper for the Public Affairs Department, Association of
Trial Lawyers of America [1985]).
63. See, e.g., Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 51, at 1200-02.
64. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 20-25. An earlier pilot study using the same study method
made an even higher estimate. See Pocincki, Dogger & Schwartz, supra note 22, at 50.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986, at 110, tables
175-76 (1985) (38.8 million hospital discharges in 1983).
66. This is based on the author's personal communication from plaintiffs' attorneys. They
seldom describe quality improvements brought about by more litigation, other than improved record
keeping.
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3. Deterrence in Perspective. One cannot reach a firm conclusion with great
confidence about the law's deterrent influence on medical care. Economic
theory and common sense agree that making responsible actors pay for faulty
outcomes should help deter substandard practice. The burden of proof
should lie with the nay-sayers, and they lack a convincing case. Evidence is
sketchy and the contending positions are more argumentative than
compelling.
There are better reasons to believe that considerable valuable deterrence
exists than that large amounts of nearly worthless "defensive medicine" exist.
Perhaps the most tangible indication of good defensive medicine has been the
emergence of "risk management" programs in hospitals. 67 In any case, to
believe that providers care only about legal defense and not about helping
patients by curbing errors seems a slur on medical ethics and
professionalism. Nonetheless, there is room for very great improvement in
deterrence.
IV
COSTS AND BENEFITS REVISITED
A. Compensation and Deterrence in the Balance
Deterrence of substandard medical care is the most important benefit of
the malpractice system. Compensation works badly, partly because of
overcompensation but mainly because of undercompensation, and the
accountability or vindication that tort law provides is quite an intangible
benefit. 68
The assessment of the malpractice system's benefits versus its costs
depends on whether one thinks valuable deterrence outweighs poor
compensation. 69 The system's intangible costs and benefits can be seen as
offsetting, and the most tangible net costs (excess of paid premiums over
67. Such programs have multiplied since the last "crisis" drew attention to malpractice
recoveries as a growing problem and to hospitals as the prime site for injuries that lead to claims.
Risk management remains in its infancy and most often seems to address "risk" in an insurance
sense-after-the-fact damage control and attempts to limit legal liability for adverse incidents once
reported or discovered. However, the field is definitely progressing; risk management has become a
recognized occupation and many programs are now trying to address root causes as well as
symptoms. Compare, for example, FEDERATION OF AM. Hosps., RISK MANAGEMENT MANUAL (1977)
with any recent issue of the bi-monthly publication of the Risk Management Foundation of the
Harvard Medical Institutions, Risk Management Forum, to see the increase in sophistication.
68. Accord P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 225-26. Without allowing for any independent value of
accountability separate from deterrence, this leading economic analyst calculates that if the deterrent
effect of malpractice reduces the extent of negligent harm by 20%, it is worth its costs. She implicitly
concludes that the deterrent effect is at least this large when she recommends retaining a fault-based
litigation system, with modifications. The estimate is necessarily rough, lacking data on the incidence
of negligence outside of hospitals and on the full costs of hospital liability coverage, including self-
insurance.
69. Indeed, those who attack the current system typically emphasize its failings in compensation.
Eg., O'Connell, supra note 25. They may mention deterrence but typically give it little attention.
E.g., Fine & Sunshine, supra note 14. In contrast, defenders often emphasize deterrence or at least
the potential for it. E.g., P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 12-17, 225-27.
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delivered compensation) can be seen as the price society must pay for an
important part of quality control for medical care. To this writer,
approximately one percent of health care spending as of 1984 does not seem
too much to pay for quality control, if it is effective. Nor do the net insurance
costs of covering malpractice seem high relative to the extent of negligent
harm they attempt to alleviate.
There is room for considerable disagreement on whether the benefits of
the tort system exceed its costs. Reforms should seek to improve the balance,
however, and not to make matters worse. The argument here is that
policymakers contemplating changes should keep their eyes firmly on the
bottom line, which is deterrence. This is true both for legislators who enact
public reforms and for any health care consumers who agree to private
reforms.
Unfortunately for deterrence, most reform proposals-whether for public
or private action-seem primarily designed to cut back on the perceived
overcompensation of some claimants. This effort seems desirable on cost
grounds if it is well targeted rather than arbitrary, a topic that is beyond this
discussion. Across-the-board cuts in compensation do not seem likely to
improve compensation generally. It is notable, for example, that most
proposals do little or nothing to correct current undercompensation problems. 70
Given the high "carrying costs" of delivering compensation through tort law
and liability insurance, the malpractice system seems almost hopelessly
imperfectible as a compensation mechanism.
What do reforms accomplish for the true value (or at least potential value)
of tort recoveries, namely deterrence? They accomplish very little. There is
some effort to reduce invalid claims, for example, by having lawyers certify the
merit of filings. But no one seems concerned about valid claims that are never
filed. Most reforms simply attempt to cut back the cost of awards. Reforms
that merely cut compensation to successful claimants and otherwise reduce
the number of claims (for example, by limiting plaintiffs' lawyers' fees) may
well actually reduce deterrence by lessening the likelihood of discovery of and
recovery for substandard care. 71 This effect is particularly unfortunate,
70. Havighurst, for one, recognizes the unfairness of today's system to nonclaimants and hopes
that private agreements will at least allow the nonlitigous to negotiate for lower health care fees or
insurance premiums. See supra note 20, at 68-70. Nonclaimants who are ignorant of their existing
legal remedies pose a different problem, however. Under the Moore "no-fault" proposal, providers
will be encouraged to make prompt offers of economic compensation so as to prevent claimants from
suing for full damages, including noneconomic ones. See Moore & Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational
Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 117. Whether
providers will offer to pay many people not now compensated rather than concentrating on obvious
tort claimants is an open question.
71. Danzon, for example, explains how some reforms affect claims frequency directly (such as
reductions in the statute of limitations), whereas others, that directly cut only awards or claims
severity (for example, collateral source rule changes), in fact, also indirectly reduce frequency by
reducing incentives to bring claims. See, e.g., Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 78-79. She nonetheless asserts,
however, that reducing overcompensation can simultaneously improve compensation and
deterrence. P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 226.
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coming as it does at a time when medical providers may be tempted to cut
corners because of the financial pressure on them from health insurers to
deliver care less expensively. 72 Improving on the current system's deterrent
effect seems an important goal, both within and possibly also outside
conventional tort processes.
B. Improving Malpractice Law, Process, and Incentives
Three major types of changes hold promise for improving the malpractice
system, especially for deterrence and quality promotion: (1) Improve
confidence in the system's accuracy and fairness; (2) Review more cases, not
fewer, through the improved system; (3) Improve the "feedback" mechanisms
that motivate and educate providers. These goals will be difficult to achieve.
1. Improve Confidence in the Deterrent System. Deterrence depends in large part
on the accuracy and fairness of the system's determinations-and the
perception of its legitimacy by affected providers, whose behavior must
ultimately be altered if deterrences is to function. Improving confidence may
be the most difficult task of all. At times in the malpractice debate partisans
on both sides simply refuse to cede any ground: Some doctors want the law
to hold that patients assume all risk of adverse medical outcomes short of
criminal malfeasance, whereas pro-liability advocates want to hold providers
liable for nearly any adverse outcome not specifically explained in advance to
patients.
The main issues here are what legal standards of care, causation, and
damages are socially appropriate and whether juries and judges in fact apply
them correctly, thus creating the proper expectations for the negotiated
settlements that dispose of the vast majority of claims. Despite numerous
pro-plaintiff doctrinal shifts, the basic "black letter" law remains as a general
matter rather favorable to defendants with regard to standards of care.73
With regard to causation and damages, the arguments seem persuasive that
the law can assess higher compensatory or punitive damages than seems
appropriate for deterrence.74 Legislatures are now wrestling with substantive
tort reforms. Achieving more consensus on basic tort principles would
presumably help improve the legitimacy of malpractice deterrence, but it is a
72. See Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1004 (1985) (arguing that cost-cutting pressure will increase malpractice liability, so reform is
needed). A contrary argument can be made that prospective payment in the long run will lower
malpractice standards both by changing the professionally defined customary practice against which
the law measures medical behavior and by reducing the expectations of claimants and jurors alike, to
the benefit of providers fearful of suit.
73. For example, medical providers are mainly judged by the customary practice of their peers;
even following the practice of a "reputable minority" is a defense; and mere "errors of judgment"
are excusable. Medical providers, unlike others, are not held to the higher standard of the
"reasonable man," that paragon of virtue who like a back seat driver never acts imprudently or takes
unnecessary risks. Nor are juries entitled-in law-to make their own assessments of the risks, costs,
and benefits of medical activities; they can but choose among the versions presented to them by
medical expert witnesses.
74. See supra notes 29, 53 and accompanying text.
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difficult goal, given the gulf between many providers and advocates of injured
patients.
Those who reject the legal system's accuracy often object that judges and
juries too often do not rationally follow the black-letter law but instead make
determinations of liability and the extent of damages based on sympathy for
injured plaintiffs or other factors. 75 Like the "frivolous suit" contention, 76
this one is hard to assess; clearly any pro-plaintiff sympathies operate in less
than "knee jerk" fashion, since most claims are closed without payment and
most juries find for defendants.
The legitimacy of tort determinations about liability and damages deserves
more attention. More systematic information about its outcomes might
improve confidence in the system, since almost everyone seems to reach
conclusions about its accuracy based on "horror stories" of outrageously
overblown verdicts on the one hand, or outrageously bad medical practice on
the other. One would have thought that the growing role of provider-owned
mutual insurers would have produced more medically oriented claims
assessment and settlement practices as well as more information justifying
those practices. More independent review of claims files, and more publicity
for the findings, might help determine how fairly the system works. 77
Improvements in dispute resolution, judicial and otherwise, might also
heighten the credibility of the system, if clear improvements can be found. 78
Curiously, little reform effort seems to be directed to understanding or
improving the accuracy of judicial decisionmaking or of pretrial settlement.
Pretrial screening (with pressures to settle before trial) and arbitration are
proffered as alternatives, but without strong documentation of their
superiority; and, in any case, both alternatives are strongly influenced by the
litigation that remains the source of substantive rules and the ultimate
arbitrator of disputes. Perhaps private reforms can develop better
arrangements, perhaps not.
75. The popular media's reporting is leaving a growing impression that many court decisions-
not merely for malpractice-have simply taken leave of commonsense reality. E.g., Kilpatrick,
Nonsense in the Court, Wash. Post, Dec. 26, 1985, at A19, col. 6. Similarly, the popular picture of the
extent of damages available is conditioned by striking headlines. The leading recent example here
also comes from outside malpractice. See, e.g., Jury Awards $10.53 Billion to Pennzoil in Texaco Case,
Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at A1, col. 2. The award is widely expected to be cut drastically during
appeals. (Pennzoil was found wrongfully to have been denied the benefit of its bargain to acquire
43% of Getty Oil when Texaco bought 100% for $10.1 billion-compared with the jury's finding of
$7.5 billion in actual damages, $3 billion in punitive damages.) Similar, if less flamboyant, stories of
apparently foolish or excessive awards abound in malpractice as well; the stories themselves often
seem exaggerated. See, e.g., Sorry, America, Your Insurance Has Been Cancelled, supra note 9, at 20-23. To
the extent that such mistakes occur in litigation, however, the only possible improvement seems to lie
in better judicial oversight-prompted in part by adverse publicity, in part by legislative instructions.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
77. Julian, supra note 50, is one such claims files review.
78. It is discouraging that one study of attitudes about arbitration found that perceptions of its
fairness followed interest groupings almost perfectly. Defendants, their lawyers, doctors, and
arbitrators thought it was fair. Claimants and their lawyers thought not. APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH,
INC., EVALUATION, STATE OF MICHIGAN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION PROGRAM, SUMMARY
REPORT 15-17 (1983).
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With regard to the performance of courts and juries, it is not clear just
what reforms might improve confidence. Some mistakes are inevitable, of
course, in any system whose basic standard for assessing liability and damages
is "more probable than not"; the question is what proportion of mistakes in
each direction is tolerable. To this writer, it appears that legislators who think
that awards are often inappropiate (or too high) ought to address judicial
administration: how judges determine whether a case is legitimate enough to
proceed to trial, what instructions juries receive, how fact finders must explain
their decisions, and how judges at trial or on appeal review trial fact finding.
Better disclosure of jury reasoning seems critical. This means more
special rather than general verdicts (a necessity in any case where a cap on
noneconomic damages must be applied). 79 It may also mean removing
certain technical issues from the jury, such as the application of a discount
rate to lost future earnings. Some physicians long nostalgically for the era
when medical providers could say "trust me" and most patients would
passively accept medical care with little explanation. Society, with informed-
consent lawyers often in the vanguard, has moved away from this posture.80
Similarly, medical providers seem to have lost trust in the "black box" of legal
decisionmaking. Clearer explanations of legal findings, especially with regard
to damages, should be helpful. Perhaps damages should be determined
separately from liability. In any case, the time seems ripe for more careful
consideration of legal process and administration.
2. Increase the Number of Valid Claims in the Deterrent System. Probably the
major flaw in the current malpractice system, both for compensation and for
deterrence, is that the system has always handled so few cases, even before
legislative efforts to cut back claims. It seems bad enough that most negligent
damage goes uncompensated, and that the comparative rarity of malpractice
claims also complicates premium rate-making, especially for physician
coverage.8' Worse still for deterrence, the relative absence of "enforcement"
through malpractice claims also confounds quality signals to physicians and
other providers of care. The scarcity of claims makes it easier for most
providers to believe that the system is random (a belief that is itself a
considerable impediment to deterrence) and harder for responsive providers
to use claims information for quality control.8 2
79. Cf Semsch v. Henry Newhall Mayo Memorial Hosp., 171 Cal. App. 3d 162, 169-70, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 913, 917-18 (1985) (error not to itemize verdict).
80. See, e.g., J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (arguing that medical
tradition militates against patient participation in decisions and that current legal requirements fail to
assure it).
81. See supra notes 9, 22 and accompanying text.
82. A low rate of enforcement is common but probably less damaging in criminal law. Surely
the proportion of speeders evading the highway patrol is even higher, for instance. But for speeders,
the (non-insurable) penalty is relatively much higher and, perhaps more importantly, the standards
being enforced are clear cut, so that the clarity and strength of deterrent signals are maintained. For
negligent medical care, insurance blunts the economic force of deterrence and the legal standards
are relatively murky, as indeed are the medical ones on which the law mainly relies to set the standard
of care.
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Almost certainly, quality would be better served by a system that detected
and dealt with a far higher percentage of negligent injuries than at present.8 3
Handling them all through conventional litigation and settlement would be
very expensive. In today's climate, where individual physicians pay most
premiums, it seems practical to expand claims frequency intentionally only if
one could simultaneously lower the per-case cost in dollars-and, one hopes,
also reduce the time and unpleasantness of disputation. Handling more
claims more efficiently is the raison d'etre of "no fault" schemes,8 4 but such
schemes would surely cost more than today's system in health care dollars,
although they might provide larger offsetting gains elsewhere.
No one seems to know how to accomplish the same goals within the tort
system. Disputes over medical performance are complicated and the medical
testimony required is expensive. It might be that more powerful screening
panels, arbitration, mediation, or some as yet unnamed method of dispute
resolution could handle malpractice cases more expeditiously and more
cheaply without an unacceptable decline in perceived fairness to claimants.
If so, one can imagine a trade-off being made-less access to courts with
their full (and expensive) panoply of tort rights for increased access to
alternatives. In practice, however, it is difficult to see how such a trade-off
could occur. It is relatively easy to curtail access to courts-and quite possibly
desirable to move disputes elsewhere-but hard to replace courts with a more
attractive deterrent mechanism, since someone must be able and motivated to
discover and come forward with valid claims. A public reform that limits the
attractiveness of going to court (through restrictions on recoveries or on
lawyers' fees, for instance) could simultaneously provide for arbitration, a
tribunal modeled on workers compensation boards, or some other process.
But it is questionable whether the new process would attract claims for a high
enough proportion of negligent injuries to promote deterrence.
Perhaps easier access to a less onerous process would by itself encourage
more patients injured by negligence to bring claims. This result could occur
if the major reason for low claims frequency today is claimants' dislike of the
legal system.8 5 It seems intuitively more plausible, however, that inability to
perceive negligence is the main reason. If so, cutting back on access to
lawyers and courts would hurt quality incentives because today's major
mechanism for finding and investigating claims is to reward lawyers-rather
well, many would say-for such policing.86 A major agenda item for making
such a trade-off attractive from the deterrent point of view is the development
of alternative ways to discover negligent injuries and bring them into a
deterrent system. Private agreements that create affirmative disclosure or
83. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
84. See O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory and Contractual
Alternatives, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 125, 127.
85. Cf Havighurst, supra note 20.
86. The conventional version is that few providers are willing to report adverse incidents, even
to their own hospital's risk management program. This observation is based on the author's personal
communication from risk managers, June 1985.
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investigatory mechanisms seem to hold more promise in this regard than
public rule-making, which probably cannot effectuate such mechanisms.
87
3. Improve the "Feedback" Mechanisms that Implement Deterrence. The best
argument that malpractice deterrence does not work is that liability insurance
destroys the intended financial incentive of liability payments. Individual
professionals or groups that do improve quality must be appropriately
rewarded through their insurance rates. Premiums ought to reflect the level
of quality achieved, regardless of what scheme applies-fault, part-fault, or
no-fault. 88 Better implementation of risk-reduction measures such as specific
advice on risk factors, more peer review, and improved risk management
would also aid in deterrence. Partially shifting from individual physician
coverage to institutional or group coverage should improve financial
incentives and result in risk reductions. The trend toward self-insurance
(normally undertaken for other reasons) is good in this regard; perhaps it will
spread from hospitals to more groups of individual providers. Nothing can
promote conscientious peer review quite like being in the same fiscal boat.
The traditional insurance rating system uses neither insurance experience
rating nor specific underwriting or coverage rules effectively to encourage
noninstitutional providers to reduce the incidence of malpractice.8 9 Casual
observers must find it difficult to take the deterrent effect of insurance rate
setting seriously when a rural general practitioner who delivers an occasional
baby and the same state's urban obstetricians pay virtually identical rates.
Quite notably, experience rating (or its near equivalent, self-insurance) is the
rule rather than the exception for hospitals, and it is in hospitals that risk
management programs have at least begun to translate malpractice
experience into effective preventive measures.
For individual physicians, pure experience rating may be difficult or
impossible to achieve because claims frequency is so low and individual risk
factors unclear. 90 Nonetheless, physicians could be given better financial
incentives based, at least in part, on their own experience by means of
retrospective rating using surcharges or rebates to policyholders, 9' or by
straightforward risk retention through deductibles or coinsurance. 92 The
question of how better to group providers for rating purposes is also
important. From a deterrent point of view, insurance groupings should
follow natural functional lines of economic and professional interest-just as
87. The Moore bill, for example, cuts back on compensatory obligations only where a provider
astutely makes a prompt offer to pay net economic losses to a negligently injured party. Moore &
Hoff, H.R. 3084: A More Rational Compensation System for Medical Malpractice, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 117, 118-19. It is unclear, however, whether this provision would prompt providers
to identify faulty conduct and offer payment in more or in fewer cases than now are brought.
88. For a discussion of deterrence under one version of partial no-fault, see Havighurst, Medical
Adversity Insurance-Has Its Time Come?. 1985 DUKE L.J. 1233, 1249-52, 1263-69.
89. See generally supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
90. But see Rolph, supra note 37.
91. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1302-03.
92. See P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 124-35 (arguing, however, that deductibles may not be
economically efficient, given that they may reduce an insurer's incentive to defend claims).
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health insurance sets rates for employment groups by their experience. Such
experience rating succeeded initially for financial reasons-it offered lower
prices to larger and to lower risk employment groups. It also gave them
incentives to control their health care spending, and they have now begun to
manage their costs of coverage as well as simply to insure against them. One
hopes for similar developments in malpractice insurance.
For physician malpractice coverage, traditional rate-making "groupings"
follow no functional lines but are merely large, often statewide, collections of
physicians in specialties with historically similar malpractice exposure. 93 Such
synthetic groupings formed only for insurance purposes may adequately
spread risk and may be well rated in accordance with their physicians'
experience, but such "groups" serve no other business purpose, have no
practical coherence, and may well not be stable over time. They thus have
almost no ability to respond constructively as a unit to the intended deterrent
of higher rates by implementing risk-reducing activities.
Rating based on functional groups would better promote deterrence. For
instance, hospitals and their physician staffs could be insured together, as has
long been noted.94 After all, most malpractice claims originate in hospital
care, and joint coverage has considerable advantages from an insurance
standpoint, such as higher, more predictable claims frequency, a larger
financial base for risk spreading, institutional continuity, economies of scale in
marketing and administration, and economies of dispute resolution resulting
from including all defendants under one policy.
Current developments make joint hospital-physician coverage even more
attractive, especially as a matter of affordability. Hospitals began 1985 with
historically high net revenues, despite cost-containment pressures, while
physicians' real incomes have been under significant pressure for some time
(a reason, one supposes, that almost all the concern over malpractice
premiums comes from the latter).95 Moreover, the physicians who evidently
face the worst malpractice problems today are obstetricians, whose child
delivery practice is almost wholly hospital based. 96  Finally, hospital
prepayment is already fostering hospital-physician joint ventures to promote
93. Id. at 94-95 (on insurance rating practice generally).
94. See, e.g., Roddis & Stewart, supra note 9, at 1302-03; Steves, A Proposal to Improve the Cost to
Benefit Relationships in the Medical Professional Liability Insurance System, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1305.
95. Hospitals Score Record Profits under DRGs, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1;
Holoweiko, Non-surgeon's Earnings: Which Specialties Are Hung Up?, MED. ECON., Feb. 3, 1986, at 206.
Moreover, hospital net revenues average some 5% of gross income, while malpractice protection
costs 1% or less; physicians take home about half of their total income as net earnings, and premiums
come to about 4%. A physician facing a 50% premium hike must cut other expenses by almost 20%
or raise prices by 2% to avoid a cut in earnings; a hospital need only cut expenses by about 0.5% or
raise prices a similar amount. Further, self-insured hospitals need not worry about being denied
coverage in a tight insurance market; they control their own capital.
96. E.g., OBs, Surgeons Fight State Insurance Pinch, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1986, at 1, col. 4. Note
that obstetricians are not the highest rated physicians; part of their "malpractice" problem may well
stem from their lower incomes than higher rated neurosurgeons, for instance. Id. at 26.
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cost control,9 7 a development that could expand to include covering
malpractice premiums and working together to control their rising cost.
Joint coverage of all practitioners in a hospital is not an unambiguously
positive development, however. It could also increase the economic
incentives for everyone with knowledge about an adverse inpatient incident to
keep quiet about it. From a strictly financial point of view, suppressing
information would be as effective a response as improving quality safeguards.
Not all quality problems occur in hospitals, and other functional groups
could also insure or self-insure together, with likely financial as well as
deterrent gains. Such groups include HMO's and physician group practices,
among others, some of which have already begun to insure themselves jointly.
The key is to rate together those with common interest and organization, in
order to encourage effective professional "peer review" or other means of
effective control. The growth of physician group practices as well as of other
groupings of providers made for health insurance purposes are encouraging
from this perspective.98
Finally, one can hope for improvements in the actual techniques of risk
management and other methods of reducing negligence. It does appear that
risk management has gained in importance and sophistication since the last
"crisis." There may or may not be an important public role in stimulating
such efforts or disseminating information about them.
V
MALPRACTICE CONTROLS IN A LARGER QUALITY CONTEXT
Malpractice is only one of a number of existing and potential social
controls over the quality of medical care. Part of the agenda for future reform
should be strengthening quality systems generally and matching the
appropriate tool to the appropriate task.99 On the one hand, the scope of
malpractice liability should probably be cut. Lacking better alternatives for
patient protection, society may well have come to expect too much from the
system. On the other hand, where malpractice rules do apply, they should
probably be enforced with more vigor.
It is a mistake to use malpractice liability to govern nearly all diagnostic
and therapeutic decisions, as well as provider-patient relations through
"informed consent." Malpractice law is too blunt an instrument and applied
too uncertainly to address many or most quality problems. Ideally, society
wants medical services that are effective, safe in the sense of having known
and acceptable inherent risks, and carefully performed. These are quite
97. E.g., Miller, Use of Hospital Data in Medical Staff Discipline, 1 Topics IN HOSPITAL LAW 37 (1985)
(emphasizes cost-effectiveness monitoring, not quality per se); see also Warnke, We're Scoring Attendings
By DRG, MED. ECON., Nov. 12, 1984, at 175.
98. Many such arrangements are known as "preferred provider organizations." See, e.g., THE
NEW HEALTHCARE MARKET (P. Boland ed. 1985).
99. Cf Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatching, Less Restrictive Alternatives and Reforms, 92
HARV. L. REV. 549 (1979) (matching problem in regulatory context).
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different aspects of technical medical quality, but malpractice only deals with
the last of them. Moreover, many important aspects of care are
nontechnical-accessibility for advice and reassurance, "caring," patient
convenience and amenities, and many others. Not all such concerns can be
addressed by one quality assurance system, but it sometimes seems that
malpractice rules try to cover them all.' 00 This broad scope seems to be one
reason that liability makes providers feel so vulnerable, even though a very
low proportion of negligent injuries ever appear as claims. Both this broad
scope and the law's infrequent application raise conflicting types of quality
concerns.
Malpractice rules and lawsuits seem best suited to deal with the carefulness
with which the chosen treatment regime is carried out. Indeed, most medical
injuries do deal with treatment errors, unforeseen mistakes, and slips of
various kinds.' 0 1 It seems likely that the malpractice system's case-by-case
assessment of performance-or something very much like it-needs to be
maintained to deal with such problems, which are numerous. It is difficult to
imagine informed consumers' voluntarily agreeing to waive rights to
adjudicate such cases in some fashion, since such errors by their nature
cannot be described in advance. One can hope for, but not confidently
predict, that alternative and less expensive ways can be found to resolve such
claims, especially ones that are relatively small. For the unusual, very serious,
or disabling injuries it is especially hard to imagine a reasonable alternative to
a malpractice-like mechanism. Existing compensatory mechanisms leave a
considerable gap between the needs of those with major or long-term injuries
and the coverage of workplace-based, year-to-year health insurance and short-
term disability coverage which is often lost if a worker must quit because of an
injury.' 0 2 Such unforeseen errors and large injuries are only one variety of
quality problems, although they seem to predominate in malpractice insurers'
spending.
Several additional points on quality deserve emphasis.
(1) Aside from malpractice claims, other legal and administrative means
for promoting quality have been rudimentary at best. Aggrieved patients
have traditionally had precious few other avenues than malpractice claims to
pursue. The main public control is licensure and state disciplinary
proceedings against incompetent physicians. Such measures have not proven
100. Cf Bovbjerg, supra note 28, at 1385-86 (breadth of malpractice "regulation" of practice).
101. Most medical injuries result from commission (active intervention) rather than omission (for
example, diagnostic errors or failure to cure existing problems). Mills, Medical Insurance Feasibility
Study, 128 WEST J. MED. 360, 363-64 (1978) (study covered hospital injuries only). Similarly,
malpractice claims generally emphasize errors of commission, not omission. NAT'L Ass'N OF INS.
COMM'RS, supra note 22, at 455. See also Danzon's comparative discussion of these other two studies,
P. DANZON, supra note 22, at 25-28.
102. Exactly how long such workplace coverages continue to pay for disabling injuries beyond the
period of employment is a function of the applicable private contracts and (to a minor extent) of state
law on insurance continuation. Medicare covers the permanently disabled (after two years of
disability), as does Medicaid, if they "spend down" their income and assets to poverty levels.
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very effective in the past, 0 3 and medical professionals have traditionally
resisted forms of discipline and even of increased consumer information that
are not under tight medical control. A more enlightened and, ultimately, self-
interested posture may be emerging. The American Medical Association, for
example, has taken a strong position that strengthened public discipline
should accompany malpractice reform. 10 4
For whatever proportion of doctors is clearly incompetent, discipline is an
important tool.' 0 5 Nonetheless, licensure and discipline remain even grosser
policy implements than malpractice law. Beyond the initial licensure exam,
state boards have no regular source of information with which to screen
providers-except perhaps reports of malpractice claims, of which they are
now sometimes apprised. Further, they cannot very effectively motivate
private parties to report problems. Moreover, license revocation is too strong
a sanction to be credible except in the very worst cases, and state reviewers
are poorly situated to devise or implement better tailored responses to quality
problems (for example, reduced hospital staff privileges). Finally, the legal
and administrative expenses even of informal administrative hearings
probably far exceed those of malpractice claims settlement. The cost of
actually withdrawing a license likely goes much higher, since a practitioner
wholly denied his livelihood is very apt to sue.
(2) Fortunately, medical ethics and the need to please customers
(including fellow professionals, especially those who refer patients) are
powerful forces. Most professionals probably have above-average individual
dedication to technical competence, although professional groups are no better
at disciplining their members in the interest of abstract professionalism than
are public boards of discipline. 106
Consumer pressure and financial incentives are also an important spur to
professional competence. The dynamic of quality competition surely works as
well for medical care as it does elsewhere in our economy, probably more so,
given that health insurance lessens consumers' concerns for the cost of quality
enhancement. Society should rely more on consumer pressure for many
quality issues. The main role of today's heightened competition is not, or
should not be, to force arbitrary cost cuts but rather to promote good value
for money spent. A strong consumer role in demanding appropriate quality
103. E.g., Derbyshire, Medical Ethics and Discipline, 228 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 59 (1974); see generally
Brook, Brutoco & Williams, supra note 51, at 1215-17. For more recent developments, see, for
example, Feinstein, The Ethics of Professionalism, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 801 (1985), and the letters it
generated, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 390-91 (1985); Murray, Tightening the Patrol for Incompetents, MED.
WORLD NEWS, Dec. 9, 1985, at 54.
104. AMA TASK FORCE, REPORT 3, supra note 38, at 15-16 (promoting, among other things, cross-
state sharing of information on disciplinary actions).
105. Astonishing high numerical estimates exist-for example, that 5 to 15% of physicians are
not fully competent. E.g., Feinstein, [reply to letter writer] 313 NEW ENG.J. MED. 390 (1985). But see
Murray, supra note 103, at 55 (questioned on his evidence, Feinstein told reporter "I'vejust heard it
[the estimate] over the years.").
106. See generally supra note 103 and sources cited therein. Discussions of professional self-
discipline merge with those of state sanctions because professionals rely on referral of cases to state
authorities for enforcement.
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could serve to bolster or to replace other mechanisms, including malpractice
law.
The key issues for an enhanced consumer role are access to information
and the ability systematically to respond to it. The law has little to offer here.
The legal doctrine of "informed consent," relying as it does for enforcement
on a credible threat of a malpractice action (very rare in practice compared
with provider visits), seems irrelevant to consumers' ability to influence
almost all medical decisions,' 0 7 although its existence may help encourage
patients to be assertive in their own right. Some reformers may also press for
a more structured consumer input, such as membership on state disciplinary
boards or hospital boards of trustees, or a required patient ombudsman in
medical institutions. 108
(3) In addition to penalizing subpar providers, providers who have better
than average quality need to be rewarded. Only marketplace forces seem
equal to this task. Here, it is encouraging that new financing arrangements,
like HMO's 09 and PPO's,10° are putting providers at some financial risk for
care. If they can improve quality by avoiding even non-negligent bad results,
they need not share in paying for extra medical care to help reduce the
damage.
(4) The major missing policy tool on the quality front is more active
intervention by non-patient "consumers," namely the large health insurers,
self-insured employment groups, third-party administrators, and others who
pay for and may also arrange for medical care. Strictly with regard to the
problem of negligent injuries, such actors are well situated to discover
problems by screening unusual patterns of procedures or outcomes of care
and then to press subrogation claims."' They could thereby make
malpractice claims frequency a better indicator of quality problems and
simultaneously reduce the overcompensation problem of double coverage of
medical bills by both liability and "collateral" insurers.
Well beyond this malpractice role, payers have the unique ability to gather
statistical evidence about the effectiveness of care across the many cases that
107. Cf J. KATZ, supra note 80 (arguing that the doctrine falls far short of entitling patients to
needed information and participation). To whatever extent providers' complaints are correct that
the doctrine of informed consent allows a patient once injured to claim that he never appropriately
agreed to the treatment provided, the doctrine actively impairs the patients' ability to exercise
control over their care, because the possibility of the later assertion of a different standard of care
will diminish the providers' trust in the patients.
108. Cf Donabedian, supra note 33, at 22-24.
109. See supra note 29.
110. See supra note 98.
111. The federal Health Care Financing Administration recently released a compilation of data
on hospitals' patient mortality by category of patient or "diagnosis-related group" (DRG). See
Brinkley, U.S. Releasing Lists of Hospitals with Abnormal Mortality Rates, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1986, at Al,
col. 3. This action drew severe criticism from hospitals and praise from consumer groups; the list is
controversial because it was meant only as a screening device, not as a quality finding. A decade ago,
consumers lost a lawsuit seeking disclosure of provider data from federally-sponsored but private
professional standards review organizations. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep't of
HEW, 668 F.2d 537, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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involve their insureds. They can thus deal with problems that are simply
impossible to detect or assess on a case-by-case basis, whether in court or
through isolated clinical judgment." 12 To date, payers' management efforts
have concentrated on cutting costs; they should be encouraged to begin to try
to improve quality as well. 1 3 This suggestion implies a greater purchaser
role in setting standards, which for the medical professions is a double-edged
sword: More active consumers may help redefine malpractice expectations,
but their incursions into traditional professional prerogatives will not please
medical professionals. Similarly, providers who seek to negotiate private
agreements to supersede or supplement malpractice law may find the
negotiations rather demanding. Well-informed employment groups with
considerable bargaining power are apt to be the first to agree to negotiations,
if not the only ones allowed by courts to make agreements changing tort
law. 114
(5) Insurers and other payers are becoming insistent that medical
providers provide care more efficiently, or just more cheaply, than under
previous patterns of open-ended coverage and little constrained payment
levels. Providers often fear malpractice suits if a bad result occurs after they
have omitted any element of desirable-or potentially desirable-care that
insurers or patients are no longer reimbursing. Indeed, both public and
private payers are retreating from the previous ideal of maximum quality at
any price.
It is unclear to what extent the law will recognize new approaches to
establishing acceptable levels of quality, including risks of injury now handled
by malpractice law. Relying less on malpractice rulings and more on other
quality measures calls for willingness to make some adjustments. This will
require broad acceptance of advance contracts about liability (probably the
hardest to "sell"), more reliance on truly informed consent (easier to
accomplish in court, harder in hospitals), or better explanations by
defendants about why alleged deficiencies were in fact economically and
socially desirable in cases of particular injuries (also difficult). In short, if
medical professionals want to be held less responsible in court for quality
problems, they need to make their practices more directly accountable to
patients, payers, and other forms of lay judgment.
112. Many quality issues are essentially statistical-how much better is one technique than another,
for instance-not all or nothing, as under malpractice, which asks whether a technique is
professionally acceptable or not under the particular circumstances. See, e.g., Bovbjerg, supra note 28,
at 1390-1407 (HMO's that use noncustomary methods may be penalized in each case of bad outcome
despite overall statistically similar or superior results); see also McClure, Buying Right: The Consequences
of Glut, Bus. & HEALTH, Sept. 1983, at 43 (medical quality is statistical, "like a batting average"; one
or two medical episodes or baseball games do not tell the full story). It is unclear to what extent
courts and judges will allow the use of statistical evidence as opposed to direct testimony on a case-
by-case basis when a doctor's hospital privileges are at stake, for instance. See Miller, supra note 97.
113. Cf Shaughnessy & Kurowski, Quality Assurance Through Reimbursement, 17 HEALTH SERV. RES.
157 (1982) (potential advantages of integrating payment and quality assurance); see also Bovbjerg &
Havighurst, Medical Malpractice: An Update for Noncombattants, Bus. & HEALTH, Sept. 1985, at 38.
114. See Fine & Sunshine, supra note 14, at 221; Ginsburg, Kahn, Thornhill & Gambardella,
Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1986, at 253, 256.
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It is tempting to call for direct trade-offs among alternative quality
protections to be made in the course of the malpractice reform debates now
under way. To an extent, this seems to be occurring, as calls are heard for
increased state discipline as a quid pro quo for malpractice "relief" for
providers. Only in such limited ways do political trade-offs seem feasible.
Most of the desirable quality changes call for long-term efforts by many
affected parties, not a straightforward, one-time legislative solution. States
could constructively address some quality and malpractice issues through
their own health insurance plans that cover state employees. States could also
allow and encourage private plans to do so, including adopting alternative
malpractice regimes in appropriate cases.
"The" malpractice problem is not solely a problem of negligence and
insuring against it, but rather is part of the larger issue of deciding on and
enforcing desired levels of medical quality. For the second time in a decade,
public attention has focused on medical liability issues, largely from an
insurance perspective. After the last "crisis" was "solved," or at least
outlasted, attention waned. One hopes that a constructive byproduct of
current concern will be greater and longer-lasting attention to the many
aspects of medical quality by both public and private actors.
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